Proxmox VEXIII · Proxmox Backup ServerPBS security
Ransomware posture and the 3-2-1 rule
What you'll learn
- Apply the 3-2-1 backup rule in a Proxmox context
- Configure PBS for ransomware resilience
- Recognise how ransomware defeats backups
- Apply PBS security hardening
Prerequisites
Verified against Proxmox VE 9.2.4 · Proxmox Backup Server 4.2.5 · Ceph Squid / Tentacle · Debian 13 (Trixie) · Linux kernel 7.0 (PVE 9.2 default) · 2026-08-07
Why this matters in production
Ransomware is the most common cause of “we have backups but we can’t recover.” The attackers target the backups too. PBS has features specifically designed for this threat.
The 3-2-1 rule
Three copies, on two different media, with one off-site.
| Rule | Meaning | In Proxmox |
|---|---|---|
| 3 copies | Original + 2 backups | Production VM + local PBS + off-site PBS |
| 2 media | Different storage types | ZFS + remote PBS (or S3, or tape) |
| 1 off-site | Different physical location | Remote PBS at a different site |
Modern variants add:
- 3-2-1-1-0: 3 copies, 2 media, 1 off-site, 1 immutable/offline, 0 errors on verification.
flowchart LR
P[Production VM] --> L[Local PBS]
P --> O[Off-site PBS]
L --> O
L --> T[Tape]
O --> S[S3 immutable]
How ransomware defeats backups
Common attack patterns:
- Encrypt production VMs first. Then reach the backups via the same network.
- Compromise backup credentials. Steal the PBS user’s API token; encrypt everything reachable from that account.
- Wait. Sophisticated attackers wait weeks, gathering credentials, then strike.
- Encrypt the backup target. Even if read-only, ransomware that runs on the PBS itself can encrypt chunks.
PBS defences
| Defence | How it works |
|---|---|
| Client-side encryption | PBS cannot read content; attacker with PBS access still cannot decrypt |
| Off-site sync | Local compromise doesn’t reach off-site copy |
| Object-lock / WORM on S3 | Backups cannot be deleted before retention period |
| Tape taken offline | Air-gap |
| Restrictive ACLs | PBS users can only access what they should |
| MFA / TFA on admin accounts | Stolen passwords alone don’t grant access |
Restrictive ACLs
Use PBS’s access controls to limit who can read, write, or prune backups:
GUI: Administration → Access Control → Users. Configure roles per user.
Detection
PBS can detect ransomware patterns in backups (some recent versions):
- Sudden changes in dedup ratio (encryption makes data appear random).
- Sudden changes in backup sizes.
- Backup failures correlated with ransomware indicators.
Set up alerts for these.
Recovery posture
If ransomware hits:
- Do not pay.
- Isolate affected systems.
- Restore from off-site / air-gapped backups.
- Re-image from known-good backups, not from the infected network.
- Investigate the entry point before reconnecting to any network.
Production considerations
Common mistakes
- Backups in the same network and credential domain as production.
- No off-site / air-gapped copy.
- PBS admin accounts without MFA.
- No restore drill from off-site copies.
Key takeaways
- 3-2-1 (or 3-2-1-1-0) is the minimum.
- Air-gap is the strongest defence.
- Rehearse ransomware recovery.
Knowledge check
Knowledge check · 3 questions
Q1. What does the "1" in 3-2-1 represent?
Q2. A backup that is reachable from the production network is safe from ransomware.
Q3. Which PBS feature prevents an attacker with PBS admin access from reading backup contents?
Passing score: 75%. Answers are checked in this browser.