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RunBook Academy

Proxmox VEXIII · Proxmox Backup ServerPBS security

Ransomware posture and the 3-2-1 rule

Intermediate⏱ ~12 min

What you'll learn

  • Apply the 3-2-1 backup rule in a Proxmox context
  • Configure PBS for ransomware resilience
  • Recognise how ransomware defeats backups
  • Apply PBS security hardening

Prerequisites

Verified against Proxmox VE 9.2.4 · Proxmox Backup Server 4.2.5 · Ceph Squid / Tentacle · Debian 13 (Trixie) · Linux kernel 7.0 (PVE 9.2 default) · 2026-08-07

Not yet marked complete on this device.

Why this matters in production

Ransomware is the most common cause of “we have backups but we can’t recover.” The attackers target the backups too. PBS has features specifically designed for this threat.

The 3-2-1 rule

Three copies, on two different media, with one off-site.

RuleMeaningIn Proxmox
3 copiesOriginal + 2 backupsProduction VM + local PBS + off-site PBS
2 mediaDifferent storage typesZFS + remote PBS (or S3, or tape)
1 off-siteDifferent physical locationRemote PBS at a different site

Modern variants add:

  • 3-2-1-1-0: 3 copies, 2 media, 1 off-site, 1 immutable/offline, 0 errors on verification.
flowchart LR
  P[Production VM] --> L[Local PBS]
  P --> O[Off-site PBS]
  L --> O
  L --> T[Tape]
  O --> S[S3 immutable]

How ransomware defeats backups

Common attack patterns:

  1. Encrypt production VMs first. Then reach the backups via the same network.
  2. Compromise backup credentials. Steal the PBS user’s API token; encrypt everything reachable from that account.
  3. Wait. Sophisticated attackers wait weeks, gathering credentials, then strike.
  4. Encrypt the backup target. Even if read-only, ransomware that runs on the PBS itself can encrypt chunks.

PBS defences

DefenceHow it works
Client-side encryptionPBS cannot read content; attacker with PBS access still cannot decrypt
Off-site syncLocal compromise doesn’t reach off-site copy
Object-lock / WORM on S3Backups cannot be deleted before retention period
Tape taken offlineAir-gap
Restrictive ACLsPBS users can only access what they should
MFA / TFA on admin accountsStolen passwords alone don’t grant access

Restrictive ACLs

Use PBS’s access controls to limit who can read, write, or prune backups:

GUI: Administration → Access Control → Users. Configure roles per user.

Detection

PBS can detect ransomware patterns in backups (some recent versions):

  • Sudden changes in dedup ratio (encryption makes data appear random).
  • Sudden changes in backup sizes.
  • Backup failures correlated with ransomware indicators.

Set up alerts for these.

Recovery posture

If ransomware hits:

  1. Do not pay.
  2. Isolate affected systems.
  3. Restore from off-site / air-gapped backups.
  4. Re-image from known-good backups, not from the infected network.
  5. Investigate the entry point before reconnecting to any network.

Production considerations

Common mistakes

  • Backups in the same network and credential domain as production.
  • No off-site / air-gapped copy.
  • PBS admin accounts without MFA.
  • No restore drill from off-site copies.

Key takeaways

  • 3-2-1 (or 3-2-1-1-0) is the minimum.
  • Air-gap is the strongest defence.
  • Rehearse ransomware recovery.

Knowledge check

Knowledge check · 3 questions

  1. Q1. What does the "1" in 3-2-1 represent?

  2. Q2. A backup that is reachable from the production network is safe from ransomware.

  3. Q3. Which PBS feature prevents an attacker with PBS admin access from reading backup contents?

Passing score: 75%. Answers are checked in this browser.